Introduction
From Ned Hanlon to Bill James, and Branch Rickey in between, the conventional strategy agreed upon to win games has changed, yet the way the game of baseball is won has not changed. A General Manager can build a team is several different ways in order to win. Also, the Manager can use different tactics and strategies to win with the team he has been given, yet the objective remains the same. You have to score more runs than the opposing team to win the game. The goal here is not to state the obvious, yet the goal is to teach what is unknown.
Predicting the unknown does not make it known, it makes it quantifiable. Sabermetrics has attempted to predict future performances of players by factoring past performances. If Joe Random hits 23 home runs in a season, does that mean Joe will hit 23 home runs next season? No! He could hit 24 home runs, 19 home runs, or even 74 home runs. Ned Hanlon had the right idea. Ned did not know if the next two batters would get a hit after the first reached with 1 or 0 outs. What he did was made the odds more in his favor. Runner on first and 1 or 0 outs, next batter lays down a bunt. Ground breaking thing the bunt was, now with a runner on 2nd, Ned only needed one hit from his team to get the run home. Runner on 2nd and 0 outs, the Ned Hanlon Managed Baltimore Orioles (The Yankees Today) would have a field day.
The Father of Conventional Baseball Wisdom, Ned Hanlon utilized the strategy of a team built in a way that the Manager could win with the team. Branch Rickey came along and created tactics that teams are built to win after playing politics. Bill James took all the strategy away from the Manager and greeted them, “best of luck to your tactical abilities.”
You don’t really win with Sabermetrics, you analyze with Sabermetrics.
Chapter 1
WAR: What Is It Good For?
Building a team on Wins Above Replacement has its fallacies. In fact you could have great success by building a team with a number of Replacement Level Players. FanGraphs put out an article about the 24 best replacement players in the league. This is 13 of the 24 players on the list and the combined WAR was for these players was +6.1 WAR. The other 11 players accounted for a -5.4 WAR which brought the total to -0.7 WAR. Instead of not ever using replacement players, just don’t use the 11 replacement players that are hurtful to the team. You can find 11 other players that could combine for a +6.1 WAR and create a team +12.2 WAR for a replacement level team. (All stats, except WAR, are career stats; WAR is from 2011-2012)
Matt Downs WAR: 0.8; AVG: .230; HRS: 20; RBI: 66; Games: 254; OBP: .296; POS: 2B, 3B; age: 31 NOTES: Matt Downs is a guy who is a great pinch hitter or for any other use off the bench. It would be smart to give a guy like Mr. Downs a 5 year/$7.2 Million deal. The deal would lock a valuable bench player up for 5 years and he would make $1.44 million a year, salary and security which become a bargain for both sides.
Ryan Sweeny WAR: 0.8; AVG: .276; HRS: 23; RBI: 224; Games: 682; OBP: .333; POS: OF; age: 30 NOTES: Ryan Sweeney is a player who could and should be an everyday player. He has a solid On-Base Percentage and a productive batting average; also he does not hurt you on defense. Because he is so undervalued, one could get a hell of a bargain for an everyday outfielder. Something like 4 years/ $10 million deal. This deal would mean you would get a solid everyday offensive outfielder for 4 years at an annual price of $2.5 million. You don’t get a .276 hitting outfielder for that kind of a deal.
Shelly Duncan WAR: 0.8; AVG: .226; HRS: 43; RBI: 144; Games: 330; OBP: .305; POS: LF, 1B; age: 35 NOTES: Every team needs pop off the bench. Shelly Duncan is obviously a career bench player, yet he is good enough to play his entire career for one team. He would bring defensive versatility off the bench and some much needed pop as well. He is a valuable utility player who should have been lock up with a team long ago. By locking up a player like this, you know year in and year out; your team has solid bench piece. A possible bargain deal for Duncan would be 5 years/ $6.25 Million. This deal would give you a solid bench piece for 5 years for only an annual cost of $1.25 Million.
Jason Bourgeois WAR: 0.7; AVG: .252; HRS: 3; RBI: 34; Games: 270; OBP: .296; POS: OF; age: 33 NOTES: Jason is a player holds great value through his speed and fielding ability. This kind of player is a career bench player, end of story. He is still valuable because he brings speed of the bench late in games and you can keep him in as a defensive sub in the next half inning. I would not lock him up as long because you don’t want to commit salary to someone who has a skill that is nearly obsolete. A 2-3 year deal worth $3.4 Million to $4.1 Million would be feasible to both parties.
Jeremy Hermida WAR: 0.6; AVG: .257; HRS: 65; RBI: 250; Games: 632; OBP: .334; POS: RF; age: 31 NOTES: This is a type of offensive outfielder that if you find a comparable offensive performer you could platoon them a financial commitment of 4 years/ $11.5 Million. This type of player can only be signed if you have the other platoon guy. It would not be a $2.875 Million commitment it would be a $5.75 Million commitment, for you have to take in consideration that it would be 2 players for 1 position over 162 games.
Brent Lillibridge WAR: 0.5; AVG: .205; HRS: 19; RBI: 71; Games: 358; OBP: .267; POS: MIF; age: 31 NOTES: Brent is not a good enough player to be locked up as a franchise bench player.
Miguel Olivo WAR: 0.4; AVG: .240; HRS: 145; RBI: 490; Games: 1124; OBP: .275; POS: C; age: 37 NOTES: Olivo is a player who should have been a franchise catcher for a team for years. At the point in his career, he is not a franchise bench player.
Austin Kearns WAR: 0.4; AVG: .253; HRS: 121; RBI: 494; Games: 1125; OBP: .351; POS: RF; age: 32 (retired) NOTES: I am surprised that Kearns was never an everyday player. I would have locked him up and made him my everyday RF.
Darnell McDonald WAR: 0.3; AVG: .250; HRS: 20; RBI: 83; Games: 331; OBP: .314; POS: OF; age: 34 (retired) NOTES: Darnell was not good enough to be a franchise bench player.
Chris Snyder WAR: 0.3; AVG: .224; HRS: 77; RBI: 298; Games: 715; OBP: .328; POS: C; age: 32 (retired) NOTES: Chris would have been a great franchise bench player. A back-up catcher and some pop off the bench is what you’re getting. Lock him up for 4 or 5 years. Depth is important for a team’s success as well.
Jordan Schafer WAR: 0.3; AVG: .228; HRS: 12; RBI: 85; Games: 463; OBP: .308; POS: CF; age: 28 NOTES: He can play defense and has a serviceable OBP, yet he is still weak with the bat. Because he is young it would be wise to lock him up due to the defensive abilities and he does get on base at a .308 clip, so he is not an automatic out. Be careful though, a 2 to 3 year deal would be smart, but don’t allow him to see free agency again, so if necessary, extend him going into his final year of the contract to avoid an increase in value on a contract year.
Eli Whiteside WAR: 0.1; AVG: .210; HRS: 10; RBI: 45; Games: 216; OBP: .265; POS: C; age: 34 (retired) NOTES: Eli brings only defense, not enough offence for a franchise bench player.
Cesar Izturis WAR: 0.1; AVG: .254; HRS: 17; RBI: 312; Games: 1310; OBP: .293; POS: 2B, SS, 3B; age: 33 (retired) NOTES: Solid utility player and good enough with the bat. A 3 year contract would sustain the infield depth on your roster.
A term I introduced in this Replacement player analysis is a Franchise Bench Player. A Franchise Bench Player is an above average utility player or pinch hitter, but not quite good enough to be an everyday player. Maybe a platoon player who makes 90 starts a year, yet the primary role and purpose for this player to give the club depth on the bench. And the club benefits for this move by knowing for 3 to 5 years that you have solid bench pieces. A 3 to 5 year deal with a bargain for an annual salary is normally what you’ll pay, for they are not undervalued, but they are not given the proper opportunity, which makes them a steal to lock up as a franchise depth player.
Too conclude, By taking a look at players who have low WAR and identifying the players who the league sees as replacement players, you can take advantage of the flaws of the WAR metric and build a very deep bench for an unimaginable price, thus, WAR is good for the strategic counter to the flaws of the WAR metric.
Chapter 2
Runs Scored/ Runs Allowed and the W-L Theorem
Runs Scored 2
W%= Runscored2 + Runs allowed2
The win loss theorem, Bill James Claims, will tell how lucky a team was over a season. A winning team outscores its opposition and the opposite for a losing team. If a winning team allows more runs than they score, that would be considered a lucky season. The 1987 Twins won the World Series and they allowed more runs than they scored. Bill James, are you telling the world that the Twins winning the World Series was something only God could’ve made happen because good teams are not outscored over a course of 162 games, and it’s especially not something a World Series Champion does in a logical world.
In 2007, the W-L Theorem put the Arizona D-Backs at 78-84 with a run differential of 712 runs scored to 732 runs allowed. The Arizona D-Backs were 90-72, the theorem shorted the D-Backs 12 wins.
In 1997, The Theorem has the Giants at 80-82 with a run differential of 784 runs scored to 793 runs allowed. The Giants were 90-72 and won the division.
To add on to run scoring; it is not as important as one would think. There has been 107 teams in the history of the game to score 900 or runs in a season. Those teams over a season had a .582 winning % or a 94-68 record (on 162 game average; the true average is 85-60-1). Yet only 46.7 % of these teams (and that is assuming that 1800s pennant winners would have been modern day playoff bound) made the playoffs. The 46.7% of the teams who did make the playoffs declined 40 points from their regular season winning %. At a .541% they played at the level of an 87 win team, barring the fact that they were 90+ win teams.